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We investigate the effect of randomness in both relationships and decisions on the evolution of cooperation.
Simulation results show, in such randomness’ presence, the system evolves more frequently to a cooperative
state than in its absence. Specifically, there is an optimal amount of randomness, which can induce the highest
level of cooperation. The mechanism of randomness promoting cooperation resembles a resonance-like fashion,
which could be of particular interest in evolutionary game dynamics in economic, biological and social systems.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 89.75.Hc, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg
Cooperation is ubiquitous in the real world, ranging from
biological systems to economic and social systems. However,
the unselfish, altruistic actions apparently contradict Dar-
winian selection. Thus, understanding the conditions for the
emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior among
selfish individuals becomes a central issue [1]. In the last
decades, several natural mechanisms of enforcing cooperation
have already been explored such as kin selection [2], retaliat-
ing behavior [3], reciprocity [4], voluntary participation [5],
development of reputation [6], or spatial extensions [7].
Since the pioneering work on iterated games by Axelrod
[3], the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) as a
general metaphor for studying cooperative behavior has drawn
much attention from scientific communities. Szabo´ presented
a stochastic evolutionary rule to capture the bounded ratio-
nality of individuals for better characterizing the dynamics of
games in real systems [8]. The individuals can follow only
two simple strategies: C (cooperate) or D (defect), described
by
s =
(
1
0
)
or
(
0
1
)
(1)
respectively. Each individual plays the PDG with its “neigh-
bors” defined by their spatial relationships. The total income
of the player at the site x can be expressed as
Mx =
∑
y∈Ωx
sTx · P · sy (2)
where sx and sy denote the strategy of node x and y. The sum
runs over all the neighboring sites of x (this set is indicated by
Ωx) and the payoff matrix has a rescaled form suggested by
Nowak and May [9]:
P =
(
1 0
b 0
)
(3)
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where 1 < b < 2. Then, the individual x randomly selects a
neighbor y for possible updating its strategy. The probability
that x follows the strategy of the selected node y is determined
by the total payoff difference between them:
Wsx←sy =
1
1 + exp[(Mx −My)/T ]
, (4)
where T characterizes the stochastic uncertainties, including
errors in decision, individual trials, etc. T = 0 denotes the
complete rationality, where the individual always adopts the
best strategy determinately. While T > 0, it introduces some
dynamical randomness that there is a small probability to se-
lect the worse one. T →∞ denotes the complete randomness
of the decision. This choice of W takes into account the fact
of bounded rationality of individuals in sociology and also re-
flects natural selection based on the relative fitness in terms
of evolutionism. Szabo´ et al. studied the effect of dynamical
randomness T on the stationary concentration of cooperators
in Ref. [10].
In a recent paper, Perc studied the evolutionary PDG by in-
troducing the random disorder in the payoff matrix [11]. The
reported results indicated a resonance-like behavior that the
frequency of the cooperators reaches its maximum at an inter-
mediate disorder. Using a different approach, Traulsen et al.
also found that the additive noise on the classical replicator
dynamics can enhance the average payoff of the system in a
resonance-like manner [12]. Vainstein and Arenzon also re-
ported that the disorder in the underlying site diluted lattices
can enhance the fraction of cooperators [13].
It is well known that intrinsically noisy and disordered pro-
cesses can generate surprising phenomena, such as stochas-
tic resonance [14], coherence resonance [15], ordering spa-
tiotemporal chaos by disorder [16], disorder-enhanced syn-
chronization [17], ordering chaos by randomness [18] etc. In
evolutionary games, the enhancement of the frequency of co-
operators at intermediate noise intensities resembles the re-
sponse of nonlinear systems to purely noisy excitations.
Presently, much interest has given to evolutionary games on
complex graphs or in structured population [5, 7, 19, 20] by
considering the fact that who-meets-whom is determined by
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 (b)
FIG. 1: (a) Illustration of a regular ring graph with connectivity z =
4. Two edges are chosen and marked by thick lines. (b) Swap the
ends of the two chosen edges. The swapped edges are marked by
thick lines.
spatial relationships or underlying networks. Complex net-
works provides a natural framework to describe the popula-
tion structure. It has been shown that, in many real-life cases,
relationships among networked individuals are neither com-
pletely random nor completely regular, but somewhere in be-
tween [21, 22]. In other words, real networks have some de-
gree of topological randomness. It is well accepted that the
topology of a network often plays crucial roles in determining
the dynamics [23]. Therefore, it is natural to ask whether this
new type of randomness will play some constructive roles for
the dynamics of the evolutionary games, i.e. is of benefit to
the cooperation, such as stochastic uncertainties T [10], dis-
ordered payoff matrix [11], noise of replicator dynamics [12],
or disordered environments[13].
In this paper, we study the effects of both the topological
randomness in individual relationships and the dynamical ran-
domness in decision makings on the evolution of cooperation.
We found that there exists an optimal amount of randomness,
inducing the highest level of cooperation. The mechanism of
randomness promoting cooperations resembles a resonance-
like fashion, wherein the randomness-induced prevalence of
the ‘good’ strategy, i.e., cooperations, evokes the positive ef-
fect of the topological and dynamical randomness on the sys-
tem.
To explore the topological randomness, we consider a ho-
mogeneous small-world network (HSWN) [24]. Starting from
a undirected regular graph with fixed connectivity z and size
N , two-step circular procedure is introduced: (i) choose two
different edges randomly, which have not been used yet in step
(ii) and (ii) swap the ends of the two edges. Here, duplicate
connections and disconnected graphs are avoided. The an-
nealed randomness is characterized by the parameter p, which
denotes the fraction of swapped edges in the network. (An
illustration of the swap process is shown in Fig. 1.) In con-
trast to the Watts-Strogatz (WS) model [21], this network has
small-world effect together with keeping the degree of each
individual unchanged, so that the pure topological random-
ness can be investigated by avoiding any associated hetero-
geneity of degree distribution [24, 25].
In all cases below, simulations start from a population of
N = 1000 individuals located on the vertices of a regular ring
graph of z = 6 with periodic boundary conditions. Initially,
an equal percentage of strategies (cooperators or defectors)
was randomly distributed among the population. Equilibrium
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FIG. 2: (Color online). (a) The frequencies of cooperators ρc vs the
temptation to defect b for p = 0, 0.2, 1, respectively, with T = 0.08.
(b) ρc as a function of the topological randomness p with various
values of the temptation to defect b for T = 0.08. The lines are used
to guide eyes.
frequencies of cooperators (ρc) were obtained by averaging
over 5000 generations after a transient time of 10000 gener-
ations. Each data is obtained by averaging over 10 different
network realizations with 10 runs for each realization. Here,
we adopted a synchronous updating rule.
Figure 2 (a) shows the frequencies of cooperators ρc on the
HSWN as a function of b for different values of the topolog-
ical randomness P with T = 0.08. In the equilibrium state,
ρc is independent of the initial state and decreases monoton-
ically as b increases. One can find that when b < 1.04, co-
operators dominate defectors significantly on the regular ring
graph (p = 0) and the more randomness of the network, the
worse the cooperation is. While for b > 1.04, the coopera-
tor is nearly extinct in the case of p = 0 and p = 1, which
correspond to the complete regular network and the complete
random network, respectively. However, the cooperator can
survive around p = 0.2, i.e., intermediate topological ran-
domness.
The dependence of ρc on the topological randomness p is
presented in Fig. 2 (b). It illustrates that there is a clear maxi-
mum ρc around p = 0.2, where cooperation can be revitalized
and maintained for substantially large values of b. This phe-
nomenon reveals that there exists somewhat resonant behav-
iors reflected by the optimal cooperation level at intermediate
topological randomness, similar to the effects of noise and dis-
order in nonlinear systems. However, it is worth to mention
that the dynamics leading to these equilibriums is the same,
and the resonant dependence of cooperation on p results from
the changes of the equilibrium states. Moreover, in Fig.2(b),
one can find that as b increases, the positive effect of topo-
logical randomness on cooperation is restricted by the favored
defection action, which is demonstrated by the reduction of
the maximum value of ρc.
In the case of regular ring graph, the local spatial relation-
ship constrains the spreading of cooperators. However, when
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FIG. 3: (Color online). (a) The frequencies of cooperators ρc vs the
parameter space (b, p) for T = 0.08. This figure illustrates two re-
gions for b: I is the resonant region where there is an optimal amount
of topological randomness p enhancing ρc; II is the harmful region
where the topological randomness p decreases the level of the coop-
eration ρc. In fact, there exists a region III beyond the shown range
of b in this figure, where the cooperators vanish and there is no p can
persist or enhance the cooperation. We call it the absorbing region.
(b) The phase diagram of the three regions of ρc in the parameter
space (b, T ). It illustrates that the resonant region decreases as the
dynamical randomness T increases.
p 6= 0, the shortcut generated by the edge-swapping reduces
the average distance of the relationship network and promotes
the strategy spreading efficiency, which induces the survival
and enhancement of cooperation. At this point, the individu-
als in the system can keep clustering locally, meanwhile they
can communicate each other more effectively due to the ran-
dom shortcuts. As p→ 1, where the edges are exchanged suf-
ficiently, the spatial relationships of the individuals are com-
pletely random and the system satisfies the mean-field approx-
imation. Based on the classical mean-field theory, the aver-
age payoff for the C and D strategies are MC = zρc and
MD = zρcb, where MD > MC always since b > 1. Accord-
ing to the dynamical rule (4), we can write down the following
equation for the motion of the frequency of cooperators:
∂ρc
∂t
= ρc(1− ρc)[WD←C −WC←D]
= −ρc(1− ρc) tanh
(
MD −MC
2T
)
. (5)
It indicates that ρc tends to zero for arbitrary value of T as
MD > MC . On the other hand, in the absence of topolog-
ical randomness (p = 0), the regular relationship graph can
be considered as a one-dimensional system in which cooper-
ators also die out [26]. While in the optimal region of p, the
underlying network has the “small-world” property: the short
average distance promotes the spreading of cooperators; the
common cluster structure induces the clustering of coopera-
tors, leading to the surviving and enhancement of cooperation
[19]. Thus, the optimal topological randomness p emerges.
To quantify the ability of topological randomness p to fa-
cilitate and maintain cooperation for various b more precisely,
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The frequencies of cooperators ρc vs the pa-
rameter space (T, p) for fixed b = 1.08.
we study ρc depending on b and p together, as shown in
Fig.3(a). One can find that when b < 1.04, ρc is a monoton-
ically decreasing function of p. We call it the harmful region
(denoted by II in Fig.3(a)) because the topological random-
ness p always decreases ρc. While for b > 1.04 (the region
is denoted by I in Fig.3(a)), there exists an optimal level of p
around 0.2, resulting in the maximum value of ρc. The posi-
tive effect of the appropriate topological randomness p on the
dynamics indicates the existence of an interesting resonance-
like manner in the evolutionary game. Thus, we call I the
resonant region. In fact, there exists a region III beyond the
shown range of b in Fig.3(a), where the cooperators vanish
and there is no p can persist or enhance the cooperation. We
call it the absorbing region.
Besides the topological randomness p, we have studied the
effect of the dynamical randomness T . Figure 3(b) illustrates
the phase diagram of the three regions of ρc in the parameter
space (b, T ). It shows clearly that as the dynamical random-
ness T increases, the resonant region reduces, i.e. the area
of the range of b where the optimal p can promote the co-
operation decreases, indicating the constructive effect of the
optimal topological randomness is restricted by the higher dy-
namical randomness.
To investigate the combined effect of both the topological
randomness and the dynamical randomness on the evolution-
ary dynamics, we fix b = 1.08, and calculate ρc in dependence
on various p and T , as shown in Fig.4. It is found that there
exists a clear “optimal island” in the parameter space (T, p)
where ρc reaches the highest value, indicating that the coop-
eration can be promoted by both the appropriate topological
and the dynamical randomness. In other words, the resonance
induced by the dynamical randomness can be enhanced by the
topological randomness, just as the noise-induced temporal
and spatiotemporal order can be greatly enhanced by an ap-
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The frequencies of cooperators ρc as a func-
tion of the rewired probability pr with b = 1.08, 1.16 for T = 0.08.
The lines are used to guide eyes.
propriately pronounced small-world connectivity of coupled
elements [27].
In addition, we study the PDG on the WS network [21] to
give a comparison with the cases on HSWNs [28]. In Fig.5,
we calculate the dependence of ρc on the rewiring probabil-
ity pr of the WS model. Contrary to the results in Fig.2(b),
there is not any optimal amount of the topological random-
ness. Instead, ρc rapidly approaches a plateau at pr = 0.2,
which is the optimal value in the case of HSWNs. Since the
only difference between the HSWN and the WS model is that
the variance of the degrees in the latter is nonzero [24], we
conclude that when pr is over 0.2, ρc can be enhanced con-
siderably as a result of the redundant heterogeneity on rela-
tionships among individuals. Moreover, due to the additive
heterogeneity, the plateau in Fig.5 is clearly higher than the
corresponding maximal values in Fig.2(b). Thus, the plateau
of ρc is the combined effect of the topological randomness and
the heterogenous spatial relationships.
To summarize, we have studied the effects of both the topo-
logical randomness and the dynamical randomness on the evo-
lutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma game and found that there ex-
ists an optimal amount of randomness, leading to the highest
level of cooperation. The mechanism of randomness promot-
ing cooperation resembles an interesting resonance-like phe-
nomenon, wherein the randomness-induced prevalence of the
cooperation evokes the positive role of the topological and dy-
namical randomness in the system. Moreover, we find that the
heterogeneity in the underlying relationship net also enhances
the cooperation. Although our work is exclusively based on
the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the “resonant” be-
havior may play a significant role in other styles of evolution-
ary dynamics.
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